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Abstract:  
We use an excludable instrument to test the effect of bilateral foreign aid on economic growth in a sample 
of 96 recipient countries over the 1974-2009 period. We interact donor government fractionalization with 
a recipient country’s probability of receiving aid. The results show that fractionalization increases donors’ 
aid budgets, representing the over-time variation of our instrument, while the probability of receiving aid 
introduces variation across recipient countries. Controlling for country- and period-specific effects that 
capture the levels of the interacted variables, the interaction provides a powerful and excludable instru-
ment. Making use of the instrument, our results show no significant effect of aid on growth in the overall 
sample. We also investigate the effect of aid on consumption, savings, and investments, and split the 
sample according to the quality of economic policy, democracy, and the Cold War period. With the excep-
tion of the post-Cold War period (where abundant aid reduces growth), we find no significant effect of 
aid on growth in any of these sub-samples. None of the other outcomes are affected by aid. 
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1. Introduction 
In a previous paper we began with an apology for adding yet another paper investigating the effect of 
foreign aid on economic growth to what is already a long list of articles (Dreher et al. 2014). We frankly 
admitted that we were unable to provide an unbiased estimate of aid’s effect on growth – as is true for 
most of the preceding literature. Since then, a number of innovative contributions have added to our 
understanding of whether and to what extent aid causally affects growth and institutions. Jackson (2014) 
suggests using natural disasters in countries receiving aid from the same donor as an instrument. Galiani 
et al. (2017) instrument aid flows with the International Development Association’s (IDA) threshold for 
receiving concessional aid. While interesting and innovative, we remain unconvinced of these identifica-
tion strategies. Jackson’s suggestion of increased short-term aid for countries unaffected by disaster as a 
consequence of disasters in other aid recipient countries from the same donor, while empirically power-
ful, lacks a theoretical foundation, and is thus potentially spurious.1 Galiani et al.’s instrument could be 
correlated with growth for reasons other than aid, as countries’ rates of growth might be influenced by 
factors other than aid at the time they exceed the IDA’s income threshold.2 The lack of a plausibly exclud-
able instrument for aid in a large sample of donor and recipient countries continues to plague the aid 
effectiveness literature at large. The question of whether aid affects recipient countries’ economic growth 
thus remains wide open.3 
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap. We are inspired by the identification strategies of Werker et 
al. (2009), Nunn and Qian (2014) and Ahmed (2016). These studies rely on plausibly excludable variables 
that do not vary at the recipient country level and interact it with a proxy for the probability of receiving 
aid. We borrow from Ahmed (2016) who exploits variation in the composition of the United States’ House 
of Representatives to instrument US aid in explaining recipient country democracy. To the extent that 
fractionalization leads to larger government budgets and larger overall budgets lead to an increase in the 
                                                           
1 On the significance of “false positives,” see Chaudoin et al. (2014). 
2 This would hold even if the decision to pass the IDA’s income threshold could not be manipulated by aid-receiving 
governments. Consider a reform-oriented government that achieves substantially higher growth rates for some 
years that eventually lead to passing the exogenous threshold. Growth dynamics will be different in these years 
compared to the years in which the country does not grow, even with an exogenous income threshold. What is 
more, governments can manipulate GDP data, which makes reaching the threshold potentially endogenous (see 
Kerner et al. 2017, who show this for aid-dependent countries). Galiani et al. test for these possibilities. Using a 
smoothed income trajectory to rule out the effect of shocks they find results that are similar to their main analysis. 
They find no evidence of data manipulation. However, their sample only covers 35 countries. Dreher and Lohmann 
(2015) focus on regional growth within countries. Their instrument for aid is an interaction of the IDA income thresh-
old with a region’s probability to receive aid, in a sample of 21 countries. 
3 Among prominent recent attempts to investigate the effect of aid, Clemens et al. (2012) do not use instruments 
and Brückner (2013) relies on rainfall and commodity price shocks, which can easily violate the exclusion restriction. 
See Werker (2012) and Doucouliagos (2016) for recent surveys. 
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aid budget, fractionalization can serve as a powerful instrument. In line with Nunn and Qian (2014) and 
Ahmed (2016) we introduce variation at the recipient country level by interacting fractionalization with 
the share of years a country receives aid from its donors.4 To the extent that variables correlated with 
donor fractionalization do not affect recipients’ rates of growth differently in regular and irregular recipi-
ents of aid, controlled for country- and period fixed effects and a battery of control variables, the resulting 
instrument is excludable. Contrary to Nunn and Qian (2014) and Ahmed (2016), we focus on growth rather 
than democracy or conflict, and aid from a group of major donors rather than (food) aid from the United 
States exclusively. Other than Werker et al. (2009), we focus on a broad set of donor countries. As we 
outline in more detail in Section 2, we investigate the link between government fractionalization and the 
effectiveness of aid as a chain of cause-and-effect relationships. Starting with the effect of fractionaliza-
tion on government budgets, we further illustrate the relation between overall budgets and aid budgets. 
In addition to investigating the effect of aid on growth, this paper’s contribution is the introduc-
tion of an instrument for aid from a large number of donors and years that can be used to address a 
substantial number of questions in the aid effectiveness literature. Though still new, our instrument has 
already been used in Bluhm et al. (2016) to investigate the effect of aid on conflict, and Ziaja (2016) in the 
context of democracy.5 We suggest a number of additional research questions where we think our instru-
ment helps overcoming the endogeneity of aid in the conclusion. 
We describe our data and method in more detail in Section 3. To foreshadow our results (shown 
in Section 4), we find that the interaction of government fractionalization and a country’s probability of 
receiving aid is a powerful instrument for aid. Using this instrument, we find no positive effect of aid on 
growth in the overall sample. Section 5 splits the sample in a number of important dimensions – the qual-
ity of economic policy, democracy, and the Cold War – and tests whether the impact of aid differs across 
these groups. With the exception of the post-Cold War period (where abundant aid reduces growth), we 
find no significant effect of aid on growth in any of these sub-samples. We also investigate the effect of 
aid on components of GDP rather than growth (in section 6). Savings, investment, and consumption are 
all unaffected by aid. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
  
                                                           
4 Werker et al. (2009) focus on aid from Arab donors and rely on a binary indicator identifying Muslim recipient 
countries, which are more likely to receive such aid compared to non-Muslim countries. 
5 Variants of it have been used to instrument International Monetary Fund loans, see Lang (2016) and Gehring and 
Lang (2016). 
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2. The argument 
Most of the previous literature pursues one of three strategies to identify the effect of aid on growth. One 
group of papers relies on instruments that relate to the size of the recipient country’s population (as a 
proxy for the ease to exercise power, e.g., Rajan and Subramanian 2008). A second group of papers fo-
cuses on bilateral political relations, for example employing voting coincidence in the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly to instrument for aid (Bjørnskov 2013). The third uses internal instruments and estimates 
difference or system GMM regressions (Minoiu and Reddy 2010). Each of these strategies is misguided. 
Population size can affect growth through many channels that researchers cannot control for and is thus 
not excludable (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). Lagged levels and differences of aid are also hardly excludable 
to growth, invalidating them as (internal) instruments. Political-relations based variables might be exclud-
able, but to the extent that the motive for granting aid affects the outcome, the resulting Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) reflects the effects of politically motivated aid rather than those of all aid (Dreher 
et al. 2014).  
A couple of recent papers suggest alternative identification strategies, based on interactions be-
tween an excludable instrument and a potentially endogenous variable (Werker et al. 2009, Nunn and 
Qian 2014, Ahmed 2016). Of these, only Werker et al. (2009) investigate the question that we address in 
this paper – the effect of foreign aid on economic growth. Werker et al. make use of oil price fluctuations 
that substantially increase the aid budgets of oil-producing Arab donors, in particular to Muslim countries. 
Specifically, their instrument for Arab aid is the interaction of the oil price with a binary indicator for Mus-
lim recipient countries, which receive the bulk of Arab donors’ aid. They find recipient country growth to 
be unrelated to aid. While we are convinced of Werker et al.’s identification strategy, their results can 
hardly be generalized to represent the effects of aid more broadly. As they point out, their results show 
the LATE for oil-price-induced increases in aid to Muslim countries, which might be unrepresentative of 
aid from a broader set of donors to a broader set of recipients. In particular, the modalities of aid delivery 
as well as the political motivations of this aid might reduce its effectiveness, as might the specific set of 
policies and institutions in the largely authoritarian recipient countries of aid from Arab donors (Werker 
et al. 2009, Dreher et al. 2014). We rely on Werker et al.’s identification strategy, closely following Nunn 
and Qian (2014) and, in particular, Ahmed (2016), but focusing on aid’s effect on growth for a large set of 
aid donors and recipients, over a long period of time. 
We rely on two additional strands of previous literature to motivate our instrument for aid. The 
first investigates the effect of government fractionalization on governments’ budgets. Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) propose that coalition governments will be more reluctant to reduce expenditures compared with 
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single-party governments, as each party of the coalition will resist pressure to cut expenditure in its own 
area, even if they are in favor of overall spending cuts. Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and Scartascini and 
Crain (2002) show that legislature fragmentation increases governments’ expenditures. We make use of 
the relationship between fractionalization and government budgets, hypothesizing that the larger budg-
ets arising due to fractionalization increase aid budgets, which in turn affect aid disbursements at the 
recipient country level. Most importantly, controlling for period fixed effects, recipient fixed effects, and 
other control variables, government fractionalization in donor countries is arguably excludable in growth 
regressions at the recipient country level. 
The second well-established strand of literature we draw from addresses the relationship be-
tween overall government budgets and their aid budgets. Brech and Potrafke (2014) and Round and 
Odedokun (2004) show that overall expenditures as a share of GDP significantly determine aid budgets. 
Interestingly, in line with our hypothesis in this paper, Round and Odedokun’s (2004) regressions exclud-
ing government expenditures show that government fractionalization increases aid budgets, “apparently 
to satisfy the various interests of the coalition” (p. 308).6 Obviously, larger overall aid budgets increase aid 
disbursements to recipient countries, on average (e.g., Dreher and Fuchs 2011). 
We use fractionalization interacted with the probability of receiving aid as our instrument for bi-
lateral aid, and argue that it is excludable to recipient country growth. As Nunn and Qian (2014: 1632, 
1638) explain, this holds even though the probability of receiving aid itself is endogenous. As they point 
out, the resulting regressions resemble a difference-in-difference approach, where we compare the effect 
of aid on growth in regular and irregular recipients of aid as donor fractionalization changes. We explain 
our identification strategy in more detail in the next section, where we introduce our data and method of 
estimation.  
One might consider two alternative instruments resulting from our hypothesized transmission 
channels: government expenditures and aid budgets. These instruments are however not necessarily ex-
cludable, given that growth shocks in recipient countries could directly affect donors’ aid budgets (and 
thus their overall budgets), while growth shocks in non-recipient countries might not. For example, 
Rodella-Boitreaud and Wagner (2011) show that donors’ total aid budgets increase with natural disasters 
in developing countries, indicating that donors adjust their total aid budget in response to shocks rather 
                                                           
6 Overall government budgets and government fractionalization do not turn out to be robust determinants of aid 
budgets in the large-scale robustness analysis in Fuchs et al. (2014). Their regressions however include various 
measures of fractionalization and fiscal policy at the same time, setting a high bar on the identification of the indi-
vidual effects. 
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than merely reallocating aid while holding budgets constant. We therefore do not use government ex-
penditures and aid budgets as instruments.7 
 
3. Method and data 
Our growth models follow the approach in Clemens et al. (2012). However, Clemens et al. do not use 
instruments, but claim to address the endogeneity of aid by differencing the regression equation and 
lagging aid, so that it can reasonably be expected to cause growth rather than being its effect. Their esti-
mates could still be biased in either direction. For example, donors might grant more aid to an incoming 
reform-oriented government. Increased growth resulting from reforms could then spuriously be at-
tributed to the increases in aid. On the other hand, donors might give more aid to countries where they 
anticipate that shocks will reduce future growth rates (Dreher et al. 2014). This is in line with Roodman 
(2015), who finds that Clemens et al. (2012) fail to remove contemporaneous endogeneity. This is why we 
see the need of using a new IV strategy.  
We base our analysis on Clemens et al.’s  permutations of Burnside and Dollar (2000), the study 
that has arguably gained the most attention in the literature on aid and growth.8 In terms of timing, our 
preferred specifications follow Clemens et al. (2012) and assume that disbursed aid takes one four-year 
period to become effective in increasing or decreasing economic growth. In all tables we also report con-
temporaneous effects of aid on growth within the same four-year period. We estimate the regressions 
with country fixed effects rather than in first differences.9 Our preferred empirical model is at the recipi-
ent-period level:  
 
                                                           
7 Some previous papers rely on aid budgets as an instrument for aid. One example is Hodler and Raschky’s (2014) 
analysis of how aid affects nightlight at the regional level. See Temple and Van de Sijpe’s (2014) analysis of how aid 
affects various components of GDP for a discussion on how endogeneity can be alleviated by filtering out common 
factors that have heterogeneous effects on the variable of interest. In Chauvet and Ehrhart’s (2014) analysis of aid’s 
effect on firm growth in 29 developing countries they instrument for aid using fiscal revenue as a share of donors’ 
GDP (interacted with joint religion or colonial history). When we use aid budgets instead of fractionalization (inter-
acted with the probability of receiving aid) as an instrument our main results are unchanged. The Kleibergen-Paap 
first-stage F-statistics are strong, as one might expect. 
8 We rely on Minasyan’s (2014) update of these data until 2009. We replicated our main analyses with Clemens et 
al.’s (2012) permutations of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) instead. Our results are unchanged. 
9 Clemens et al. (2012) seem to prefer a measure of early-impact aid over all aid. This measure has been shown not 
to be a robust predictor of growth (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bjørnskov, 2013; Roodman, 2015). What is more, 
a major drawback with this measure is that disaggregated aid disbursements are not available for the entire period, 
so that disbursements have to be estimated based on commitments. Data on commitments in the earlier periods 
also suffer from severe underreporting, which is not addressed in Clemens et al. (2012) (see OECD/DAC CRS Guide, 
Coverage Ratios, accessed on March 3, 2014: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsguide.htm). We therefore prefer 
to focus on overall aid. 
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     ℎ , = β     ,    + β     ,   
  +    , β  +  β    + β    +   , , (1) 
 
where Growthi,t is recipient country i’s average yearly real GDP per capita growth over a four-year pe-
riod t.10 Aidi,t-1 denotes the amount of net aid (as a percentage of GDP) disbursed by the 28 bilateral donors 
of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the previous period. Some specifications also 
include aid squared to test for decreasing returns to aid, following Clemens et al. (2012).    represent 
recipient country fixed effects,    period fixed effects, and εi,t the error term. Standard errors are boot-
strapped based on pairwise recipient country clusters.11 
All regressions include the set of contemporaneous control variables used in Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), which we denote as Xi,t: Initial GDP/capita, Ethnic Fractionalization, Assassinations, Ethnic Frac-
tionalization*Assassinations, dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, Institutional Quality, M2/GDP 
(lagged), and Policy.12 Some words of caution are in order. The instrumental variables approach that we 
explain in more detail below does not rely on these control variables – our instrument does not violate 
the exclusion restriction in their absence. We thus face a trade-off between increasing the efficiency of 
the estimator and introducing bias via the potential endogeneity of the control variables and their corre-
lation with predicted aid. While we include the control variables in the main analysis, note that our results 
are qualitatively unchanged when we exclude them.13  
A skeptical reader might also be concerned about the Nickell bias arising from the inclusion of 
initial GDP per capita. When we exclude initial GDP per capita, our results remain robust. When we correct 
                                                           
10 We include recipient countries that have been on at least one “DAC List of ODA Recipients” between 1997 and 
2013. Appendix E shows these countries. The results are unchanged when we instead estimate the aid-growth rela-
tionship in a dyadic setting. 
11 However, even though we are using a constructed instrument, IV standard errors are consistently estimated as 
long as the second-stage error term is not correlated with our donor-recipient-specific instrument (     ,  ∗  , ) 
from the zero-stage regression (Wooldridge 2010). In line with Atkinson and Cornwell (2011) we also employ wild 
bootstrap at the second-stage to test robustness (using cgmwildboot, Cameron et al. 2008). Standard errors are 
based on the bootstrapped p-values as these rather than standard errors are pivotal. Our results do not change 
when using alternative bootstrap approaches or when not bootstrapping standard errors. 
12 To reduce clutter, we do not show them in the main tables. Note that the time-invariant variables are removed 
here (as in Clemens et al. 2012) through the inclusion of country fixed effects. Also note that we do not control for 
Burnside and Dollar's measure of good policy, given that improvements in policy might be an important transmission 
channel by which aid affects growth. We lose about 200 observations when we include the good policy indicator. 
Our results however do not depend on its exclusion. While the first-stage F-statistics are somewhat lower in the 
reduced sample, the coefficients of interest are within the respective Anderson-Rubin 90%-confidence intervals. We 
also estimate regressions including an imputed good policy indicator to avoid losing observations. Our results are 
again unchanged. Appendix A reports the sources and definitions of all variables, while we show descriptive statistics 
in Appendix B. Appendix D reports the full specifications for the main regressions. 
13 See Table C1 in the Appendix.  
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for the bias by applying the procedure developed by Bruno (2005a, 2005b) for unbalanced dynamic panel 
models using the Anderson-Hsiao and Arellano-Bond estimators, our results are equally unchanged, irre-
spective of whether or not we include the remaining covariates.  
We estimate a zero-stage regression at the donor-recipient-period level as follows: 
 
    , ,  =γ      ,  ∗  , +   , , . (2) 
 
Aidi,j,t denotes the amount of aid (as a percentage of GDP) from donor j disbursed to recipient i in 
period t. We predict bilateral aid with the interaction of donor fractionalization      ,   and the probabil-
ity of receiving aid pi,j, which varies across donor-recipient pairs and periods.14 Standard errors in equation 
(2) are clustered at the donor-recipient country level. One might be concerned about potential direct 
effects of the probability of receiving aid on economic growth. However, our growth regressions control 
for the effect of the probability of receiving aid as well as the level of donor fractionalization through the 
inclusion of recipient country and period fixed effects. Given that the effect of the potentially endogenous 
variable is controlled for, the interaction of the endogenous variable with an exogenous one can be inter-
preted as being exogenous (Nunn and Qian 2014, Bun and Harrison 2014, Nizalova and Murtazashvili 
2016).  
As an alternative approach to construct our instrument, we include the levels of the interaction 
term as well as time and country fixed effects in equation (2) and predict aid relying on γ . Taking the 
coefficient from the interaction term (γ ) ensures that we construct our instrument from using exogenous 
variation only. Our first- and second-stage results remain the same to the extent that we control for the 
same factors in the first- and second-stage regressions. One might be concerned that the two approaches 
differ if donor fractionalization depended on donor-recipient pair characteristics. While we consider this 
                                                           
14 Instead of exploiting the contemporaneous variation of our instrumental variable, we could as well lag fractional-
ization (and its interaction) to allow for sufficient time between aid commitments and their disbursement. We do, 
however, prefer to focus on contemporaneous values, in line with the previous literature. When we lag fractionali-
zation by one four-year period, our second-stage results are unchanged. The instrument’s power in the first-stage is 
slightly below 10 for contemporaneous aid in the linear specification and above 10 for the other three specifications. 
As a falsification test, we also used fractionalization one period in the future interacted with the probability of re-
ceiving aid. Reassuringly, the first-stage F-statistic is below one, indicating the lack of power of future fractionaliza-
tion. 
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unlikely, to ensure that our results do not depend on this modelling choice we add the levels of the inter-
action term and donor-recipient fixed effects to equation (2) in a robustness test.15 
We also compared the different modelling choices of the zero-stage in case of one endogenous 
variable in a simulation analysis. What is more, we compared the findings to the approach when predicting 
aid relying on all coefficients of the zero-stage regression including the levels of the interacted instrumen-
tal variable, country-pair and time fixed effects. In balanced samples, we find these different methods to 
lead to the same second-stage results. Note that after aggregating over all donors the donor-recipient-
specific probability is then captured by recipient-country fixed effects (when proceeding as in equation 
2). When instead controlling for time fixed effects in the zero-stage, the probability is captured by the 
time fixed effects at this level. The donor-specific time-varying measure of government fractionalization 
is the same across recipients and is consequently captured in the time fixed effects after we have aggre-
gated the data over all donors. The only variation that remains at the first- and second-stage level is the 
exogenous variation introduced by the interaction term. This holds irrespective of the three different 
modelling choices: a) including only the interacted instrument as in equation 2; b) predicting aid relying 
on γ  from a zero-stage regression which also includes the levels of the interacted instruments and fixed 
effects; and c) the same regression as in b) but predicting aid from all coefficients.16 
One might also be concerned about the fact that we do not control for the second-stage covari-
ates in the dyadic equation (2). The dyadic zero-stage equation constructs an instrument from exogenous 
variation, which we then use in the usual 2SLS procedure at the recipient-level. After aggregating over all 
donors, we use the constructed instrument and control for the second-stage covariates in the first-stage 
regression. Thus, the remaining variation is the exogenous variation introduced by our constructed instru-
ment conditional on all second-stage covariates.  
The intuition of our approach is that of a difference-in-difference approach, where we investigate 
a differential effect of donor fractionalization on the amount of aid to countries with a high compared to 
                                                           
15 We compare the zero-stage results and corresponding second-stage results when excluding (column 1) or includ-
ing the levels of the interaction term and donor-recipient fixed effects (column 2) in Table C2 in Appendix C. The 
second-stage results are unchanged.   
16 With the single dyadic instrument that we have here, there would be a further alternative, which does not require 
the zero-stage or gravity-like approach. Starting at the donor-recipient-period level, we could aggregate the interac-
tion between fractionalization and the probability to receive aid over all donors and take this as an instrument at 
the recipient-period level for     (see equation (1)). The equivalence between the zero-stage approach and this 
alternative is given for a single dyadic instrumental variable (when including more dyadic instrumental variables, the 
zero-stage accounts for a weighting of these separate instruments). As we control for the levels of the interaction 
term through the inclusion of fixed effects at the recipient-period level, we are left with one dyadic instrument here. 
Indeed this approach leads to identical results compared to the zero-stage approach.  
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a low probability of receiving aid. The identifying assumption is that growth in countries with differing 
probabilities of receiving aid will not be affected differently by changes in fractionalization, other than via 
the impact of aid, controlling for recipient country and period fixed affects and the other variables in the 
model. In other words, as in any difference-in-difference setting, we rely on an exogenous treatment and 
the absence of different pre-trends across group. Controlled for period fixed effects, donor-government 
fractionalization cannot be correlated with the error term and is thus clearly exogenous to aid. In order 
for different pre-trends to exist, these trends across countries with a high compared to a low probability 
to receive aid would have to vary in tandem with period-to-period changes in donor fractionalization. 
Given that donor fractionalization follows no obvious trend in our data, we consider this implausible.17 
In order to ensure that our result is not driven by omitted variables that affect regular and irreg-
ular recipients of aid differently, we also control for recipient country characteristics such as economic 
freedom and trade (as a percentage of GDP), both as a level and interacted with the probability of receiv-
ing aid, respectively. The effect of aid on growth is unaffected and F-statistics remain around the threshold 
of 10. Moreover, the dyadic instrument remains strong at the zero-stage regression when controlling for 
a number of donor and recipient country characteristics as economic freedom, ideology, overall trade, 
bilateral imports and exports and donor GDP per capita growth.18  
We aggregate equation (2) across donors for each recipient and period, resulting in the fitted 
value of aid as a share of GDP at the recipient-period level (in analogy with Rajan and Subramanian 2008, 
for example): 
 
    ,  = ∑  γ       ,  ∗  , +   , ,    . (3) 
 
                                                           
17 Following Christian and Barrett (2017) we plot the variation in government fractionalization in tandem with the 
variation in aid and growth for two different groups that are defined according to the mean of the probability to 
receive aid. Figure 4 in Appendix F plots these graphs. They give no reason to believe that the parallel trend assump-
tion is violated in our case. More precisely, the probability-specific trends in aid and growth, respectively, seem 
rather parallel across the regular recipients (those with a probability to receive aid that is above the mean) and the 
irregular recipients (with the probability to receive aid being below the mean). There is also no obvious non-linear 
trend in regular compared to irregular recipients that is similar for aid and growth. What is more, these trends do 
not overlap with the trend in government fractionalization. In analogy to Christian and Barrett (2017), our identifi-
cation strategy would be at risk in the presence of a non-linear trend in government fractionalization that is similar 
to the trends in aid and growth for the group of regular recipients. A common trend in all three variables, that is not 
different for regular and irregular recipients would, to the contrary, be captured by our time fixed effects. 
18 The detailed results are available on request. 
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We then instrument     ,    in equation (1) with our constructed instrument     ,    from equa-
tion (3) at the recipient-period level.19 We instrument     ,   
   with the square of predicted aid to GDP 
from the first-stage, following Wooldridge (2010: 268). Our results are robust when we instead use the 
square of fitted aid to GDP (from equation 3) as an instrument for aid squared (from equation 1). 
A priori, it is unclear whether legislature or government fractionalization is more suitable as an 
instrument. As Ahmed (2016) points out for the United States, the “funding and allocation of bilateral 
economic aid involves both the executive branch and Congress” and the same is true for the other donor 
countries in our sample. As it is the government that drafts the budget plan and not the legislature, we 
measure donor fractionalization as the probability that two randomly-chosen deputies from among the 
parties forming the government represent different parties (Beck et al. 2001). This would come at the 
disadvantage that there is no variation in government fractionalization for the United States and Canada 
across our period of observation. We therefore replace government fractionalization with legislature frac-
tionalization for these countries.20 Our results are unchanged when we (i) do not replace these values, (ii) 
omit the two countries, and (iii) use legislature instead of government fractionalization for all countries. 
We proxy a country’s probability of receiving aid with the percentage of years the country re-
ceived aid from a particular donor over the sample period, following Ahmed (2016) and Nunn and Qian 
(2014). Specifically, the probability of receiving aid from a particular donor j is    ,     =
 
  
∑   , , 
  
    , with 
  , ,  indicating whether recipient i received positive amounts of aid from donor j in year y. To test robust-
ness we alternatively included the probability to receive aid over each four-year period (and its interaction 
with fractionalization) rather than those over the whole sample period.21  
                                                           
19 This follows Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and – in the context of trade rather than aid – Frankel and Romer 
(1999). Our results are unchanged when we include donor-recipient pair and period fixed effects in the zero stage 
regression (with first-stage F-statistics becoming stronger). They are also unchanged when we instead replace 
    ,    in equation (1) with     ,    predicted from a first-stage regression that includes donor-recipient pair and 
period fixed effects as well as the control variables from the second-stage. 
20 Unsurprisingly, government fractionalization in Canada and the United States is constant. While most DAC donor 
countries have parliamentary systems with proportional representation, there are exceptions (e.g., plurality voting 
system in Canada and presidential elections in the United States). The United Kingdom and France also differ from 
the remaining donors as they lack proportional representation. However, in both countries government fractionali-
zation varies. In a robustness test, we also replace government fractionalization with legislature fractionalization for 
the United Kingdom and France. Results at the different stages remain unchanged.  
21 Our results do not depend on this choice. 
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Figure 1: Probability to receive aid and average aid, 1974-2009 period 
 
We argue that the extent to which changes in aid budgets affect aid receipts depends on a coun-
try’s probability of receiving aid. Both Nunn and Qian (2014) and Ahmed (2016) show that the probability 
of receiving aid is indeed significantly correlated with the amount of US (food) aid a country receives. The 
same holds for our sample, for a broad set of donors, as can be seen in Figure 1. The Figure plots the 
average probability of receiving aid (i.e., recipient i’s probability of receiving aid from any donor over the 
whole sample period) on the horizontal axis and the average aid received from all donors as a percentage 
of GDP on the vertical axis. The correlation between the two is 0.31, significant at the one-percent level. 
For example, the figure shows that Afghanistan received aid in 63 percent of the years in the 1974-2009 
period, amounting to about 37 percent of its GDP. On the lower end of the scale, Kuwait received 0.0085 
percent of its GDP as aid, and received aid in 12 percent of the years in the sample. 
To establish the link between fractionalization and aid disbursements in our sample, we proceed 
with re-estimating specifications from the previous literature, illustrating this link with our data, at the 
donor-recipient-period level.22 
                                                           
22 We focus on the donor-recipient-period as this is the framework we use to predict aid (see equations 2 and 3).  
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Table C3 in Appendix C closely follows the regressions in Scartascini and Crain (2002), and Roubini 
and Sachs (1989), respectively, but includes our measure of fractionalization rather than theirs. The de-
pendent variable is annual central government expenditure as a share of GDP for the 28 donor countries 
in our sample over the 1974-2009 period, focusing on four-year averages, as in our main regressions. As 
can be seen, government expenditures increase significantly with fractionalization, at the one-percent 
level of significance. The estimated effect of an increase in fractionalization from zero to one is in the 
range of a 0.85-2.8 percentage point increase in central government expenditures (with a sample average 
of 32.30 percent). 
Figure 2 shows the partial leverage plot for fractionalization corresponding to the regression of 
Column 1 in Table C3. The figure shows that the results are not driven by obvious outlying observations.23 
 
Figure 2: Fractionalization and Central Government Expenditures, 1974-2009 period, Table C3, 
column 1 
 
We next turn to the effect of government budgets on aid budgets. Table C4 shows how an increase 
in central government expenditures translates into larger aid budgets, broadly following the regressions 
                                                           
23 When we restrict the sample to those observations that we can use in the growth regressions below, results in 
Table C3 stay robust. The same holds for those in Table C4 below. 
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of Fuchs et al. (2014). The results show that an increase in central government expenditures by one per-
centage point increases governments’ aid budgets by between 0.002 and 0.006 percentage points, at the 
one-percent level of significance. For the average country in our sample this amounts to a maximum in-
crease of 1.5 percent of its government’s aid budget. Put differently, a one standard deviation increase in 
expenditures translate into a 0.06 percentage point increase in the aid budget to GDP ratio, which repre-
sents 24 percent of its standard deviation.  
Figure 3 shows the partial leverage plot between government expenditures and aid budgets, 
based on column 1 of Table C4. The figure suggests that an outlying observation (representing Italy over 
the 1974-1977 period) potentially affects the result. When we remove this observation our results are 
however unchanged, suggesting a high positive correlation between central government expenditures 
and aid budgets. Arguably, larger aid budgets will translate into larger aid disbursements at the individual 
country level, on average. 
 
Figure 3: Central Government Expenditures and Aid Budgets, 1970-2009 period, Table C4,  
column 1 
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4. Main results 
Table 1 shows the results for our main specifications, estimated with OLS for comparison. As can be seen, 
GDP per capita growth is not significantly correlated with contemporaneous aid (column 1).24 There is no 
evidence of a non-linear relationship, as indicated by the insignificant squared term in column 2. In line 
with Clemens et al. (2012), the impact of aid on growth turns stronger when aid is lagged, as can be seen 
in columns 3 (without aid squared) and 4 (including aid squared). The coefficient for lagged aid is more 
than twice the estimate in the comparable regressions in Clemens et al. (2012).25 The regression shows 
that an increase in lagged aid by one percentage point of GDP is accompanied by higher growth of a mag-
nitude of 0.25 percentage points in the linear (column 3) and 0.30 in the non-linear regression for the 
average country (column 4).26 Note that the squared term in column 4 is again not significant at conven-
tional levels, indicating no evidence that the effect of aid on growth is decreasing in aid. Arguably, these 
estimates are not causal, as omitted variables could easily explain the correlations. 
Before discussing the IV results presented in Table 2, it is important to note that the interaction 
of donor fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid is statistically significant at the 1%-level in 
the zero-stage regression (equation (2), Table C2 in Appendix C). The corresponding F-statistic of the in-
teraction term is 101. Obviously, when taking the alternative approach to equation (2) by including donor-
recipient pair fixed effects the respective F-statistic drops to a lower value, 14.7, which is still clearly above 
the threshold of 10. The coefficient of the dyadic instrument in equation (2) amounts to 0.363 with a 
standard deviation of 0.035. An increase in fractionalization from zero to one thus increases bilateral aid 
to recipient countries that receive aid in all years by 0.363 percentage points of GDP. The dyadic instru-
ment provides the exogenous variation that we use to calculate the exogenous part of bilateral aid (as a 
percentage of GDP). After aggregating over all donors, we use the sum of fitted bilateral aid (fitted aid to 
GDP, over all 28 DAC donors) in order to measure its causal effect on growth at the recipient-period level. 
Table 2 shows the results at the recipient-period level using fitted aid to GDP as an instrument for 
actual aid. The control variables from Table 1 are included in all first- and second-stage regressions, but 
we exclude them from the table to reduce clutter.27 Column 1 focuses on contemporaneous aid, instru-
mented with     , , in analogy to equation (3). The table also shows the corresponding first-stage results. 
                                                           
24 Note that to facilitate comparison we restrict the sample to those observations that are also included in the 2SLS 
regressions below.  
25 Specifically, their estimated coefficient is 0.096 (in column 4 of their Table 7), which is however not significant at 
conventional levels. 
26 The coefficient for the linear aid term is 0.361 and for aid squared -0.008 in the comparable regression in Clemens 
et al. (2012), both significant at the five-percent level (in column 7 of their Table 7). 
27 Appendix D shows the full results. 
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As can be seen in the table, the Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap first-stage F-statistics are above Staiger 
and Stock’s (1997) rule-of-thumb threshold of ten.28 The underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap LM 
statistic) clearly rejects the Null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. 
Column 2 includes aid squared, which we instrument with the square of predicted aid to GDP of 
the first-stage. The test statistics given in column 2 of Table 2 refer to this instrument; statistics for aid 
itself are equivalent to those shown in column 1. The results show strong first-stage F-statistics; un-
deridentification is again easily rejected.  
Columns 3 and 4 show results for our preferred specifications, replacing contemporaneous values 
of aid with their lagged values (equation 1). The statistics indicate that for the linear and squared term 
the instrument for aid is strong. The results show no significant effect of aid or aid squared on growth. 
There is no evidence that aid causally affects growth.29 The significant correlations shown in Table 1 and 
in Clemens et al. (2012) are thus likely to be spurious. Potentially, donors anticipate growth-promoting 
policies – due to more reform-oriented politicians assuming power, for example – and increase their aid 
to such countries. 
We conclude that there is no evidence that aid increases growth and offer a number of explana-
tions. First, aid or growth might not be measured precisely enough to capture the effects of aid in a rather 
small sample of less than 800 observations. Second, even if aid would be measured precisely, the small 
number of observations implies that our tests are underpowered. In order for our tests to show an effect 
of aid if it was actually there with an 80 percent probability we would require more than 6000 observa-
tions rather than the sample of roughly 800 that we have.30 This is an unfortunate feature that we share 
with the aid effectiveness literature at large (Ioannidis et al. 2016).31 Third, the effects of aid might be 
spread over different horizons, and our four-year averages might be inadequate to capture these effects.32 
                                                           
28 Stock and Yogo (2005) propose more specific sets of critical values for weak identification tests based on the 
number of endogenous regressors, the number of instruments and the acceptable maximum bias of the 2SLS relative 
to OLS regression or the maximum Wald test size distortion. For example, a 20-percent 2SLS size distortion of a five-
percent Wald test is associated with a critical value of 6.66 and a lower value of 4.42 for a 20-percent LIML (limited 
information maximum likelihood) size distortion. 
29 We also used logged aid/GDP rather than the level of aid along with its square, which allows for a decreasing 
marginal effect of aid even though it does not allow its effect to change sign. Our results are unchanged. 
30 This high number of required observations is driven by our fixed effects setting, as both country and time fixed 
effects in tandem with the set of covariates capture most of the variation in the dependent variable so that the 
variation caused by aid conditional on these variables is rather small. 
31 According to Ioannidis et al. (2016), only about one percent of the 1779 estimates in the aid and growth literature 
surveyed have adequate power (see also Doucouliagos 2016). 
32 A detailed analysis of longer lags is beyond the scope of this paper. When we include further lags of our aid varia-
bles, the second lag stays insignificant (8 years), but there is some evidence that growth might increase with even 
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Fourth, aid might be effective in some groups of countries but not in others, and our pooled sample could 
hide such effects. We turn to this in the next section. Finally, of course, aid might simply not increase 
growth. 
 
5. Heterogeneous effects of aid 
Our instrumental variables regressions estimate the effect of variation in bilateral aid flows that go dis-
proportionately to regular and irregular recipients of aid as a result of differences in government fraction-
alization. We have no reason to believe that the LATE cannot be generalized to be representative of bilat-
eral aid more broadly. However, the previous literature suggests that the effects of aid vary across a re-
cipient country's policies and institutions. Most importantly, it has been suggested that aid is effective in 
countries with good economic policies (Burnside and Dollar 2000), in democracies (Svensson 1999), or 
after the end of the Cold War (Headey 2008), but not otherwise. All of these interactions have been shown 
to be fragile (e.g., Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009), but none of these earlier studies investigates causal 
relationships. Rather than introducing interaction effects, we split the sample according to the median of 
Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) good policy index (based on inflation, the budget balance, and openness to 
trade), Cheibub et al.’s (2010) binary indicator of democracy, and the years before 1991 and after 1990, 
respectively. 
Table 3 shows the results. As can be seen, aid has no significant linear effect on growth in any of 
the samples. With one exception, the results also show that there is no significant non-linear effect of aid 
on growth. The exception is the regression in column 6 where we split along the Cold War dimension. Aid 
squared is significant (at the five-percent level) after the end of the Cold War. However, the coefficient is 
negative with a level effect that is also negative, indicating that if aid had any effect at all it would reduce 
growth. 
 Overall, our results show no positive effects of aid on growth in any of the sub-samples and a 
negative effect of abundant aid on growth after the Cold War period.  
 
  
                                                           
longer lags (from 12 years on). The number of observations in these regressions is however comparably low, and we 
did not investigate the robustness of these results. 
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6. Where does the aid go? 
In the final substantive section of the paper we investigate the effects of aid on components of GDP, with 
the aim of testing where aid is spent. The insignificant effect of aid on GDP per capita growth could be the 
result of aid being spent on consumption rather than investment. Alternatively, aid could increase invest-
ment, but investments might be ineffective in increasing economic growth. The policy implications of 
these results would be substantially different.33 
We investigate the effect of aid on investment, overall consumption, private sector consumption, 
and government consumption. We also investigate the effect of aid on domestic savings, testing whether 
aid inflows are substituted by equivalent decreases in domestic savings. Specifically, we focus on gross 
capital formation (in percent of GDP), household final consumption expenditure (in percent of GDP) and 
government final consumption expenditure (in percent of GDP), with overall consumption being the sum 
of the two, and gross domestic savings (in percent of GDP). We use the same covariates and timing as in 
our aid-growth regressions above. 
Table 4 shows the results. As can be seen, aid has no significant effect on any of the variables in 
any period. Specifically, there is no effect of aid on consumption, savings or investment in the overall 
samples, countries with good or bad policies, democratic or undemocratic countries, or during or after 
the Cold War period. Overall, our results therefore contrast with those of the previous literature. Boone 
(1996), for example, reports that aid increases consumption, but not savings and investment. Werker et 
al. (2009) find that household and government consumption both increase with aid, that savings decrease 
with aid, and investment is unaffected (all focusing on Arab donors and the recipients of their aid exclu-
sively). Temple and Van de Sijpe (2014) confirm the positive impact of aid on total consumption, which 
seems to be driven mainly by household consumption. This shows the importance of the choice of iden-
tification strategy, as well as the sample of donors and recipients, for testing the effect of aid on the out-
comes of interest.  
 
  
                                                           
33 Werker et al. (2009) find aid from Arab donors to be consumed rather than invested in large parts. They also show 
that domestic savings decrease with increased aid inflows. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has proposed an excludable instrument to identify whether and to what extent foreign aid 
affects economic growth. Cross-sectional variation arises due to changes in aid disbursements following 
differences in donor countries’ government fractionalization. Temporal variation is introduced by inter-
acting fractionalization with the probability of a certain country receiving aid. The approach resembles a 
difference-in-difference approach, the difference being that our treatment variable (fractionalization) is a 
continuous rather than a binary indicator.  
Using aid disbursement data for all bilateral donors of the OECD’s DAC to a maximum of 96 recip-
ient countries over the 1974-2009 period, we find our instrument to be powerful. For the average recipi-
ent country this represents roughly quadrupling the amount of current (bilateral) aid. In contrast, coun-
tries that receive aid only half of the time can expect an increase in aid inflows of 0.183 percentage points. 
Applying the instrument to our growth models, we find bilateral aid to be ineffective in increasing eco-
nomic growth in the overall sample and various sub-samples, split along the quality of economic policies, 
democracy, and the Cold War period. In the years after the end of the Cold War, we find growth to de-
crease with abundant aid. We also investigate the effect of aid on savings, consumption, and investment, 
and do not find any effect of aid in the overall sample or our sub-samples. 
Our results show that bilateral aid has no robust effect on short-term growth. We would like to 
stress that this finding does not imply that aid is necessarily ineffective. One might argue that aid is meas-
ured imprecisely, and standard errors are too large. Statistical power might be too low for the estimators 
to find a significant effect, even if it would be there (Ioannidis et al. 2016). We agree that these are two 
possible explanations for our insignificant results. We still believe that it is important to show, and publish, 
these results, as the published literature on the effectiveness of aid tends to be over-optimistic, due to 
institutional biases of the authors in the aid effectiveness literature and the well-known bias of journal to 
publish (only) significant results (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009, Doucouliagis 2016). As the lack of power 
pertains independent of the significance of the results, there is arguably no reason to dismiss ours on the 
grounds of large standard errors, compared to a number of recent papers finding significant (and positive) 
results. We therefore urge readers to evaluate this paper on its methodological improvements over the 
previous literature, rather than its results.  
At least one other important reason can explain the insignificant results: Donors pursue a multi-
tude of objectives when granting aid, with economic growth being just one of them. To the extent that 
donors prioritize geo-strategic goals over developmental ones the effects of “true” developmental aid will 
be higher than those of all aid (Dreher et al. 2014). Aid would then need to be evaluated based on progress 
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towards its “true” goals.  While we did not investigate such outcomes here, the effects of aid on a number 
of alternative outcomes have been documented, including on terror (Azam and Thelen 2008), voting be-
havior in international organizations (Vreeland and Dreher 2014), and conflict (Nunn and Qian 2014).  
 We would like to conclude this paper by pointing to a number of important questions that could 
be addressed with our instrumental variables strategy, for a large number of donors and years. The effect 
of aid on formal and informal institutions, economic freedom, conflict, terrorism, migration, and the size 
of the shadow economy, among others, has been investigated in a large number of papers. All of these 
questions face the problem of endogeneity between aid and the variable of interest. Our instrument is 
well-suited to address this problem, as has been demonstrated in Bluhm et al. (2016) for conflict, and 
Ziaja (2016) for democracy. In providing an instrumental variable that is suitable to address the endoge-
neity of aid in a broad setting of questions, we hope to contribute in providing a more nuanced under-
standing of the various causal effects the aid might have. 
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Table 1: Aid and Growth, 1974-2009, OLS 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the recipient-period level. Recipient- and period-fixed effects 
are included. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the recipient country level; significance 
levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). Models are based on Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
  
               (1)            (2)   (3) (4)
Aid/GDP        0.049         -0.058          0.250**        0.311***
           (0.059)        (0.123)        (0.120)        (0.096)   
Aid/GDP squared        0.003                        -0.002   
           (0.004)                       (0.005)   
Log Initial GDP/capita       -2.949***       -3.049***       -3.330***       -3.287***
           (0.619)        (0.696)        (0.588)        (0.631)   
Assassinations       -0.013         -0.005         -0.221         -0.220   
           (0.187)        (0.185)        (0.189)        (0.188)   
Ethnic*Assassinations       -0.688         -0.700          0.015          0.010   
           (0.809)        (0.802)        (0.556)        (0.554)   
M2/GDP (t-1)       -0.009         -0.008         -0.002         -0.002   
     (0.006)        (0.006)        (0.008)        (0.007)   
Aid lagged? no no yes yes
Number of observations 739 739 636 636
Adjusted R-squared    0.151      0.153     0.197      0.196   
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Table 2: Aid and Growth, 1974-2009, IV 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the recipient-period level. Recipient- and period-fixed effects 
are included. First- and second-stage include as control variables: Log initial GDP/capita, Assassinations, 
Ethnic*Assassinations, and M2/GDP (lagged). Pairs cluster bootstrap standard errors with 500 replications 
are in parentheses in the second-stage regressions (clustered at the recipient country level). Standard 
errors are in parentheses in the first-stage regressions (clustered at the recipient country level). Models 
are based on Burnside and Dollar (2000). The first-stage statistics reported in columns 2 and 4 refer to the 
squared aid term. The statistics for the linear term in columns 2 and 4 are identical to columns 1 and 3, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses in the zero-stage regression (clustered at the donor-re-
cipient level). Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. 
  
               (1)            (2)   (3) (4)
Aid/GDP       -0.298         -0.254         -0.087          0.002   
           (0.441)        (0.403)        (0.378)        (0.378)   
Aid/GDP squared       -0.011         -0.018   
           (0.012)        (0.016)   
Aid lagged? no no yes yes
Number of observations 739 739 636 636
Adjusted R-squared    0.298      0.299      0.304      0.306   
Controlling for level of govfrac yes yes yes yes
Controlling for Probabilityi yes yes yes yes
First-Stage
Fitted Aid/GDP        5.208***        5.208***        5.483***        5.483***
(1.308) (1.308) (1.215) (1.215)
Squared predicted Aid/GDP        1.195***        1.126***
     (0.386)        (0.212)   
Cragg-Donald F stat. 12.370 18.893 14.799 16.576
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 15.881 9.586 20.393 28.113
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 14.427 6.958 17.263 18.720
K-P LM stat. p-val.    0.000      0.008      0.000      0.000   
Zero-Stage
Fractionalization*Probability        0.363***
     (0.035)   
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Table 3: Aid and Growth, 1974-2009, IV, Different Samples 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the recipient-period level. Recipient- and period-fixed effects 
are included. The first- and second-stages include as control variables: Log initial GDP/capita, Assassina-
tions, Ethnic*Assassinations, and M2/GDP (lagged). The bad/good policy sample includes countries be-
low/above the median according to the Burnside-Dollar good policy index. Democracy is measured with 
the binary indicator of Cheibub et al. (2010). Pairs cluster bootstrap standard errors with 500 replications 
are used (clustered at the recipient country level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). Models 
are based on Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
 
  
               (1)            (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6)
bad policy good policy undemocratic democratic <1991 >1990
Linear effect                            
     Aid/GDPt        0.734         -0.747         -0.228          0.579         -0.604   -1.220
     Observations 252 487 421 264 304 435
    Aid/GDPt-1        0.521         -0.228         -0.408   2.005       -0.296          0.023   
     Observations 198 438 341 246 224 412
Non-linear effect          
    Aid/GDPt        0.747         -0.726*        -0.221          0.584         -1.323*  -1.018
    Aid/GDPt squared        0.001         -0.003         -0.001         -0.005          0.080         -0.026** 
     Observations 252 487 421 264 304 435
     Aid/GDPt-1        0.642         -0.226         -0.391          1.991**       -0.863          0.163   
     Aid/GDPt-1 squared       -0.038         -0.000         -0.005         -0.023          0.079         -0.009   
     Observations 198 438 341 246 224 412
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Table 4: Aid and Other Outcomes, 1974-2009, IV, Different Samples 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are – all as a percentage of GDP – Overall Consumption, government final 
consumption expenditure (Gov. Consumption), household final consumption expenditure (Private Con-
sumption), gross capital formation (Investment), and gross domestic savings (Savings). The coefficients 
shown refer to contemporaneous and lagged Aid as a percentage of GDP. The bad/good policy sample 
includes countries below/above the median according to the Burnside-Dollar good policy index. Democ-
racy is measured with the binary indicator of Cheibub et al. (2010). Data are averaged over four years at 
the recipient-period level. Recipient- and period-fixed effects are included. The first- and second-stages 
include as control variables: Log Initial GDP/capita, Assassinations, Ethnic*Assassinations, and M2/GDP 
(lagged). Pairs cluster bootstrap standard errors with 500 replications are used (clustered at the recipient 
country level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). Models are based on Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). 
  
                     (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)   (5) (6)          (7)   
all bad policy good policy undemocratic democratic <1991 >1990
Investment                                                             
     Contemporaneous        0.444          0.553          0.713          0.165   1.842       -0.374   -4.316
     Observations 722 238 473 401 258 293 425
     Lagged        0.851          0.889   1.072        0.598   3.882 1.231 -1.519
     Observations 620 182 425 321 240 213 403
Savings
     Contemporaneous       -0.821          0.875         -0.207          0.831   -1.776        0.703   -3.726
     Observations 727 243 474 405 259 297 426
     Lagged -1.350       -0.200         -0.968         -0.700   -2.439 2.846 -9.624
     Observations 625 186 427 325 242 216 405
Overall Consumption
     Contemporaneous 0.850       -0.656          0.227         -0.765   1.767       -0.688   3.760
     Observations 726 242 474 405 259 296 426
     Lagged 1.328        0.295          0.951          0.723   2.264 -2.862 9.593
     Observations 623 184 427 325 241 213 405
Gov. Consumption
     Contemporaneous       -0.168         -0.551         -0.685   -1.021        0.737         -0.926          0.078   
     Observations 726 242 474 405 259 296 426
     Lagged        0.476          0.132          0.233          0.422          0.624         -0.602   3.314
     Observations 623 184 427 325 241 213 405
Private Consumption
     Contemporaneous 1.022       -0.105          0.917          0.257   1.044        0.238   3.708
     Observations 726 242 474 405 259 296 426
     Lagged        0.859          0.164          0.729          0.301   1.683 -2.260 6.311
     Observations 623 184 427 325 241 213 405
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Appendix A: Definitions and sources 
Variable Description Data Source 
Agency Dummy 1 if there are national aid agencies operating 
independently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Donor). 
Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Aid/GDP ODA Total Net, current prices (USD) in percent of re-
cipient GDP, aggregated over all 28 bilateral DAC do-
nors. 
OECD (2014), Table DAC2a, 
WDI (2014) 
Aid Budget/GDP Donor ODA Total Net, current prices (USD) – to all 
recipients divided by donor GDP in current prices. 
OECD, WDI (2014) 
Central Government Ex-
penditures/GDP 
Central government expenditures (% of GDP) annual 
percent of GDP (Donor). 
IMF/GFS (2014) 
Closed Lists When proportional representation is 1, closed list 
gets a 1 if voters cannot express preferences for can-
didates within a party list, 0 if not (Donor). 
Database of Political Institu-
tions (Beck et al. 2001) 
Log Colony Log of the population of former colonies on DAC list 
of ODA recipients (1997-2013), 0 if no colonial his-
tory (Donor). 
Own calculations based on 
Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Democracy Dummy 1 if recipient country is a democracy. Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Donor Exports Log value of Exports from donor to recipient country 
in US Dollars (constant 2005 USD). 
IMF (DOTS) 
Donor GDP/capita Growth GDP per capita growth (annual %) (Donor). WDI (2014) 
Economic Freedom Economic Freedom, chain linked index. Fraser Institute 
Donor GDP Growth GDP growth (annual %) (Donor). WDI (2014) 
Government Consump-
tion/GDP 
General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP). 
WDI (2014) 
Fractionalization (Frac) The probability that two deputies picked at random 
from among the government parties will be from dif-
ferent parties. 
Database of Political Institu-
tions (Beck et al. 2001) 
Investment/GDP Investment – gross capital formation (% of GDP). WDI (2014) 
Log GDP/capita Log of donor GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD).  WDI (2014) 
Log Population Log of population total (Donor).  WDI (2014) 
Overall Consumption in % 
of GDP 
Overall consumption: sum of private and govern-
ment consumption (% of GDP). 
Own construction based on 
WDI (2014) 
Political Globalization KOF Political Globalization Index composed of em-
bassies in country (25%), membership in interna-
tional organization (27%), participation in U.N. Secu-
rity Council missions (22%), international treaties 
(26%). 
Dreher (2006), updated in 
2013 
Population (Share>64) Population ages 65 and above (% of total) (Donor). WDI (2014) 
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Presidential Dummy 1 for a presidential country (Donor). DPI (Beck et al. 2001) 
Private Consumption/GDP Household final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP). 
WDI (2014) 
Probability over all Periods The probability of receiving aid from a particular 
donor j within the whole observation period from 
1974-2009. 
Own construction based on 
ODA Total Net Data from 
OECD (2014), Table DAC2a 
Recipient Exports Log value of Exports from recipient to donor 
country in US Dollars (constant 2005 USD). 
IMF (DOTS) 
Savings/GDP Gross domestic savings (% of GDP). WDI (2014) 
Total Seats Total seats in the legislature or in the case of bi-
cameral legislatures, the total seats in the lower 
house (Donor). 
Database of Political Institu-
tions (Beck et al. 2001) 
Trade Openness Trade (% of GDP) (Donor). WDI (2014) 
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (na-
tional estimate) (Donor). 
WDI (2014) 
Burnside and Dollar 2000 specification (4-year periods) 
Assassinations Average number of assassinations in a given pe-
riod. 
Banks (2012, 2007)* 
Ethnic*Assassinations Interaction between Assassinations and Ethnolin-
guistic Fractionalization. 
Banks (2012, 2007), Easterly 
and Levine (1997), Roeder 
(2001)* 
Budget Balance Overall budget balance, including grants. Meas-
ured as cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP). 
WDI (2005,2007), IMF (IFS) 
2005*  
Ethnolinguistic Fractionaliza-
tion 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization in a country in a 
given period. 
Easterly and Levine (1997), 
Roeder (2001)* 
GDP/capita Growth GDP per capita growth (%) based on constant lo-
cal currency. 
WDI 2007* 
Inflation Natural log of (1+consumer price inflation). WDI (2005, 2007), IMF 
(2005)* 
Institutional Quality First non-missing value of the ICRG composite in-
dex [0, 10]. 
ICRG* 
Log Initial GDP/capita Logarithm of initial GDP per capita in Interna-
tional prices. 
Penn World Tables 6.2* 
M2/GDP Lagged Money and quasi-money (% of GDP). WDI (2007)* 
Openness Wacziarg-Welch (2008) extension of the initial 
Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index. 
Wacziarg and Welch (2008), 
updated by Clemens et al. 
(2012)* 
Policy Index Good policy index based on budget balance/GDP, 
inflation and trade openness (cf. Burnside and 
Dollar 2000). 
Calculation based on Clemens 
et al. (2012) 
Region Dummies Dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. Clemens et al. (2012)* 
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Notes: *Our source is Clemens et al. (2012), www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-
Files.zip, accessed 22.01.2014. More details can be found in the “Technical Appendix to Counting chick-
ens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,” www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Pa-
pers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 22.01.2014. Data for the most recent period 
are from Minasyan (2016). The variables listed below the Burnside and Dollar (2000) specification are 
recipient-specific characteristics.  
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: Government fractionalization is replaced with legislature fractionalization for the United States 
and Canada. Descriptive statistics refer to the sample of column 1 for Tables 1 and 2, 7, C3, and C4.  
Variables Tables 1 and 2 mean sd min max
GDP/capita Growth 1.56 3.78 -32.42 17.05
Aid/GDP 3.60 4.81 -0.15 47.91
Probability of Receiving Aid 0.55 0.13 0.12 0.73
Log Initial GDP/capita 7.99 1.01 5.14 10.80
M2/GDP, lagged 6.36 22.14 0.02 236.92
Institutional Quality 4.48 1.61 1.58 9.50
Assassinations 0.30 1.01 0.00 11.50
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.46 0.29 0.00 0.93
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
East Asia 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Policy Index (Burnside & Dollar 2000) 1.65 0.84 -2.61 2.63
Democracy (Cheibub) 0.39 0.47 0.00 1.00
Polity IV 0.43 6.63 -10.00 10.00
Fractionalization (Donor) 0.34 0.25 0 0.81
Variable Table 7
Government Consumption/GDP 14.39 6.07 3.92 49.86
Private Consumption/GDP 69.48 16.24 17.70 180.81
Overall Consumption/GDP 83.88 16.05 32.29 194.85
Investments/GDP 21.80 7.76 4.42 68.28
Savings/GDP 16.13 16.02 -94.85 67.71
Variables Table C2
Central Government Expenditure/GDP 32.30 9.69 11.90 54.01
Fractionalization (Donor) 0.39 0.26 0.00 0.81
GDP Growth (annual %) 2.99 1.93 -4.02 9.78
Trade Openness 76.51 37.15 17.80 201.48
Log Population 15.98 1.51 12.30 18.64
Population (share>64) 13.14 2.81 4.18 18.10
Log GDP/capita 10.11 0.52 8.53 11.00
Closed Lists 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Total Seats in the Legislature 231.99 148.40 58.00 669.75
Presidential 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Unemployment 6.94 4.45 1.80 22.30
Variables Table C3
Aid Budget/GDP 0.43 0.25 0.00 1.03
Central Government Expenditure/GDP 31.79 9.93 11.90 54.01
Log GDP/capita 10.24 0.31 9.58 11.00
Aid Agency 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Log Colony 11.48 8.43 0.00 21.34
Political Globalization 86.44 10.59 53.67 97.91
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Appendix C: Additional Regressions 
Table C1: Aid and Growth, 1974-2009, IV, no covariates 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the recipient-period level. Recipient- and period-fixed effects 
are included. Pairs cluster bootstrap standard errors with 500 replications are in parentheses in the sec-
ond-stage regressions (clustered at the recipient country level). Standard errors are in parentheses in the 
first-stage regressions (clustered at the recipient country level). The first-stage statistics reported in col-
umns 2 and 4 refer to the squared aid term. The statistics for the linear term in columns 2 and 4 are 
identical to columns 1 and 3, respectively. 
 
 
  
               (1)            (2)   (3) (4)
Aid/GDP       -0.128          0.080          0.071          0.072   
           (0.463)        (0.461)        (0.394)        (0.467)   
Aid/GDP squared       -0.019         -0.000   
           (0.018)        (0.020)   
Aid lagged? no no yes yes
Number of observations    739      739      636      636   
Controlling for level of govfrac yes yes yes yes
Controlling for Probabilityi yes yes yes yes
First-Stage
Fitted Aid/GDP        5.421***        5.421***        6.047***        6.047***
     (1.354)        (1.354)        (1.358)        (1.358)   
Squared predicted Aid/GDP        2.247***        2.046***
     (0.753)        (0.667)   
Cragg-Donald F stat.       12.231       6.872        17.023         13.908   
Kleibergen-Paap F stat.       16.054          8.912         19.856          9.434   
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat.       14.570          9.018         17.119          9.196   
K-P LM stat. p-val.        0.000          0.003          0.000          0.002   
Zero-Stage
Fractionalization*Probability        0.363***
     (0.035)   
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Table C2: Zero-stage, Alternative Approaches  
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the donor-recipient-period level in the zero-stage regression 
and at the recipient-period level in the second-stage regression. Standard errors are in parentheses in the 
zero-stage regression (clustered at the donor-recipient level). Pairs cluster bootstrap standard errors with 
500 replications are in parentheses in the second-stage regressions (clustered at the recipient country 
level). Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.  
               (1)            (2)   
Zero-Stage
Fractionalization*Probability      0.363***     0.213***
   (0.035)   (0.053)
Cragg-Donald F stat. 266.727 12.018
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 100.964 14.713
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 104.912 14.514
K-P LM stat. p-val. 0.000 0.000
Second-Stage
      -0.298         -0.298   
     (0.441)        (0.441)   
Controlling for the levels of the interaction no yes
Controlling for time FE, country pair FE no yes
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Table C3: Fractionalization and Central Government Expenditures, 1974-2009, OLS 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the donor-recipient-period level. Donor- and period-fixed 
effects are included. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the donor-recipient country level; 
significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). Model (1) is based on Scartascini and Crain (2002), Model 
(2) on Roubini and Sachs (1989). 
  
            Scartascini & 
Crain (2002) 
Roubini & 
Sachs (1989)
Fractionalization        2.787***        0.848***
                 (0.254)        (0.199)   
Log Population      -11.918***                
                 (0.999)                  
Trade Openness       -0.045***                
                 (0.005)                  
Population (Share>64)        1.560***                
                 (0.047)                  
Log GDP/capita      -10.967***                
                 (0.520)                  
Closed Lists        2.549***                
                 (0.182)                  
Total Seats        0.038***                
                 (0.002)                  
Presidential        6.929***                
                 (0.460)                  
Cent. Gov. Expenditure/GDP (t-1)                       0.147***
                                (0.008)   
GDP Growth                      -0.306***
                                (0.024)   
Unemployment                       0.385***
                                (0.022)   
Number of observations 19869 18795
Adjusted R-squared        0.881          0.933   
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Table C4: Central Government Expenditures and Aid Budgets, 1970-2009, OLS 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the donor-recipient-period level. Donor- and period-fixed 
effects are included. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the donor-recipient country level; 
significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). Models are based on Fuchs et al. (2014). 
                     (1)            (2)   (3) (4) (5)
Cent. Gov. Expenditure/GDP      0.00227***      0.00624***      0.00204***      0.00619***                
                 (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)                  
Aid Budget/GDP (t-1)      0.60443***                     0.62425***                     0.63044***
                 (0.004)                       (0.003)                       (0.004)   
Log GDP/capita      0.40166***      0.54257***      0.44947***      0.56575***      0.30256***
                 (0.015)        (0.015)        (0.014)        (0.016)        (0.009)   
Agency      0.05431***      0.08541***      0.03634***      0.07792***      0.05488***
                 (0.002)        (0.004)        (0.002)        (0.004)        (0.002)   
Log Colony     -0.13997***     -0.66135***     -0.10085***     -0.65162***     -0.04685***
                 (0.007)        (0.009)        (0.006)        (0.010)        (0.004)   
Political Globalization                                    0.00426***      0.00189***                
                                               (0.000)        (0.000)                  
Fractionalization                                                                  0.03076***
                                                                             (0.003)   
Number of observations        21838          21838          21838          21838          35263   
Adjusted R-squared        0.940          0.887          0.943          0.888          0.943   
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Appendix D: Full Regressions 
Tables 1 and 2  
 
Notes: Data are averaged over four years at the recipient-period level. Recipient- and period-fixed effects are included. Standard errors are in 
parentheses in columns 1-4 (clustered at the recipient country level, significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01); pairs cluster bootstrap standard 
errors with 500 replications are used in columns 5-8 (clustered at the recipient country level; significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01). Models 
are based on Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
                     (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)            (6)            (7)            (8)   
Aid/GDP        0.049         -0.058          0.250**        0.311***       -0.298         -0.254         -0.087          0.002   
                 (0.059)        (0.123)        (0.120)        (0.096)        (0.441)        (0.403)        (0.378)        (0.378)   
Aid/GDP squared        0.003                        -0.002         -0.011         -0.018   
                 (0.004)                       (0.005)        (0.012)        (0.016)   
Log Initial GDP/capita       -2.949***       -3.049***       -3.330***       -3.287***       -4.135**       -4.847**       -4.268***       -4.924***
                 (0.619)        (0.696)        (0.588)        (0.631)   (1.790) (2.249) (1.487) (1.365)
Assassinations       -0.013         -0.005         -0.221         -0.220          0.049          0.078         -0.204         -0.179   
                 (0.187)        (0.185)        (0.189)        (0.188)        (0.282)        (0.290)        (0.264)        (0.304)   
Ethnic*Assassinations       -0.688         -0.700          0.015          0.010         -0.802         -0.863         -0.007         -0.068   
                 (0.809)        (0.802)        (0.556)        (0.554)   (1.043) (1.090)      (0.929)   (1.056)
M2/GDP (t-1)       -0.009         -0.008         -0.002         -0.002         -0.004         -0.003          0.000          0.003   
     (0.006)        (0.006)        (0.008)        (0.007)        (0.010)        (0.010)        (0.010)        (0.010)   
Aid lagged? no no yes yes no no yes yes
Number of observations 739 739 636 636 739 739 636 636
Adjusted R-squared    0.151      0.153      0.197      0.196      0.298      0.299       0.304      0.306   
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Appendix E: Sample 
DAC Donors 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
 
Recipient Countries 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Barbados 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea 
Kuwait 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix F: Parallel Trends 
 
Figure 4 Parallel Trends 
 
Notes: Panel A shows how government fractionalization (replaced by legislature fractionalization for the 
United States and Canada) varies over time. Panel B is the average aid to GDP-ratio within the group that 
is below the mean of the probability to receive aid (black line) and the group that is above the mean (grey 
line) over time. Panel C is the average real GDP per capita growth rate within these two groups over time. 
For the construction of the averages we use observations from the sample of column 1 for Table 1. 
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